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COMMENTS
ered in chronological order. The appellate court's first decision 8
denying enforcement of a board order because the court found
the examiner to be biased was reversed and remanded.49 In its
second opinion °5 0 the appellate court considered the evidence pro
and con on the record as a whole, and again refused to enforce
the board's order-this time on the ground that there was not
substantial evidence to, support the board's conclusions. The
Supreme Court in its second opinion51 approvingly recognized
the appellate court's review of the whole record and affirmed the
decision.
Speaking of the circuit court's review the Supreme Court
said, "The court painstakingly reviewed the record and unani-
mously concluded that the inferences on which the Board's
findings were based were so overborne by evidence calling for
contrary inferences that the findings of the Board could not,
on the consideration of the whole record, be deemed to be sup-
ported by 'substantial' evidence." 52 Thus the circuit court's sec-
ond decision of National Labor Relations Board v. Pittsburg
Steamship Company5 3 stands as an approved example of a review
of the record as a whole, in which it was found that opposing
evidence detracted so much from the weight of the evidence
upon which the board relied that the evidence for the board's
conclusion was less than substantial.
Thomas J. Poch6
Criminal Liability for Nonsupport of an
Illegitimate Child
With the passage of Act 164 of 1950, Article 74 of the Crim-
inal Code, which establishes criminal liability for the non-
support of a wife or child, was broadened to cover illegitimate
children. A provision was inserted to the effect that "Solely for
the purpose of determining the obligation to support the court
[1951)) handed down the same day the Court decided the Universal Camera
case, it was held that this case was controlled by the Universal Camera
decision. Therefore the case is discussed as being subsequent to the Universal
Camera case.
48. 167 F. 2d 126 (6th Cir. 1948).
49. 337 U.S. 656 (1949).
50. 180 F. 2d 731 (6th Cir. 1950).
51. 340 U.S. 498 (1951).
52. Id. at 502.
53. 180 F. 2d 731 (6th Cir. 1950).
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shall admit proof of paternity or maternity or both." 1 The
1950 amendments have given rise to considerable controversy
regarding the manner and extent of their application.
It was contended by the prosecution in State v. Randall2 that
the statute, as amended, worked an implied repeal of the pro-
visions of the Civil Code which set out the rules on presumption
of paternity. It was the state's contention that evidence could
be introduced to show that the child of a married woman was
fathered by the defendant and not by the woman's husband,
who had failed to disavow the child within the prescribed time.8
The court held that there was no express repeal of the codal
articles in the statute and, implied repeals being frowned upon,
the two provisions would be read so as to give effect to both of
them. The articles on presumption of paternity were held to be
unaffected by the 1950 act, the court offering another explanation
of the provision in the statute allowing the introduction of proof
of paternity. In the case of a legitimate child, it said, this part
of the statute would allow proof of the marriage of the accused
to the child's mother and his failure to disavow. In the case of
an illegitimate child, proof could be introduced under the statute
to show that the child's mother was unmarried and that the
accused was its father.4 The court pointed out that as the statute
furnished no definition of a legitimate or illegitimate child those
found in the code would apply and the child here involved would
be the legitimate offspring of its mother's husband under the
provisions on presumption of paternity. Thus, in its first encoun-
ter with the judicial process the statute was restricted in its
application, the court desiring that a man continue to be the
judge of his own honor.5
1. In addition to the inclusion of illegitimates and the addition of the
above quoted provision on proof, there was also added to the statute a
paragraph drafted so as to make a person leaving a wife or child in neces-
sitous circumstances guilty of the crime at the time and place of his
departure, if he later fails to support them. This was accomplished by
virtue of a presumption of his intent to desert them at the time of his
departure, which is effectuated by his later failure to support. Its purpose
is, of course, to give venue to the parish in which the deserted family
resides, which parish has greater interest in prosecuting the offender.
2. 219 La. 578, 53 So. 2d 689 (1951).
3. Under Art. 184 et seq., La. Civil Code of 1870, the husband of the wife
Is presumed to be the father of children born during the marriage. He may
disavow them under certain conditions set out in that section, but this
privilege must be exercised timely under Articles 191, 192, La. Civil Code of
1870.
4. 219 La. 578, 53 So. 2d 689, 691 (1951).
5. The court quoted from Succession of Saloy, 44 La. Ann. 433, 443, 10 So.
872, 876 (1892) on this point: "When, aware of the circumstances under
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A further examination of the statute was necessitated by
the cases of State v. JonesO and State v. Sims,7 which raised the
important issue of whether or not paternity could be proved in
the same proceeding in which the criminal liability was sought
to be enforced. The court held that the statute was intended to
enforce a legal obligation already existing by virtue of a civil
liability on the part of the father to support his illegitimate chil-
dren and that there was no such obligation on the father unless
he had either acknowledged the child or had been declared its
parent in a previous court action.8 It concluded that because
neither of these conditions had been met, criminal liability did
not attachY Referring to the court's reasoning in these decisions
to the effect that there could be no criminal penalty for failure
to perform a duty which did not exist under the civil law,10
Justice Hawthorne, dissenting in the Sims case, contended that
the statute itself was the source of the duty in that it establishes
an obligation to support illegitimate children, which is indepen-
dent of any civil obligation to do so. The dissenting justice also
differed with the majority statement that the provision allowing
proof of paternity (or maternity) was evidence of the fact that
there could be no criminal liability without civil liability.". The
reason for this section, he said, was not to require compliance
with an existing liability under the code, but to allow proof of
paternity (or maternity) for the purpose of the criminal suit
which he might have exercised the right of repudiation, the husband, who is
the sovereign arbiter of his own honor, fails to do so, the door is forever
closed and no one can afterward assert a right strictly personal to him."
6. 56 So. 2d 724 (La. 1952).
7. 57 So. 2d 177 (La. 1952).
8. Compare this holding with Art. 242, La. Civil Code of 1870, which deals
with the right of illegitimates to sue for alimony: "But in order that they
may have a right to sue for this alimony, they must: (1) Have been legally
acknowledged by both their father and mother, or by either of them from
whom they claim alimony; or they must have been declared to be their
children by a judgment duly pronounced, in cases in which they may be
admitted to prove their paternal or maternal descent; (2) They must prove
in a satisfactory manner that they stand absolutely in need of such alimony
for their support." This article would seem to provide the civil liability
which the court referred to in its opinion.
9. The child involved in the Sims case was an adulterous bastard (Art.
182, La. Civil Code of 1870) and could not be lawfully acknowledged (Art.
202, La. Civil Code of 1870).
10. In support of this idea, the majority opinion in State v. Jones and
Chief Justice Fournet's concurring opinion in State v. Sims cited State v.
Clark, 208 La. 1047, 1053, 24 So. 2d 72, 74 (1945), wherein the court said, in
allowing evidence as to the cause of the accused's leaving his wife: "..
there can never be an intentional nonsupport of a wife or child if there is
no legal duty or obligation on the part of the husband and father to
support them."
11. 57 So. 2d 177 (La. 1952).
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while limiting the purpose and effect of the proof to that par-
ticular action.12
It would seem, then, in the light of the three recent cases,
two of which reviewed the subject at some length, that the ques-
tion of whether or not a duty under the Civil Code must be
found as a condition precedent to a criminal prosecution under
Article 74 of the Criminal Code has been answered in the affirma-
tive. The nature of the civil obligation and the manner of its
proof, however, are still to be considered., It should be noted at
this point that under the dictum of the Randall case 1 the proof
submitted in the Jones, Love and Sims cases might well have
been permitted had the court seen fit to give the statute a
broader interpretation than that which it chose. Whether or not
the statute will be further restricted in its application remains
to be seen.
The court's test of alternative prerequisites raises a number
of interesting questions.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
Presumably a formal acknowledgment under Civil Code
Article 203 would suffice under the above standard as a basis for
the criminal action, but what of the informal acknowledgment?
At one time our court took the view that, while an acknowledg-
ment by the mother of the child would be sufficient if made
informally, 14 the father's acknowledgment, to be effective, had to
be in accordance with Article 203 of the code.' 5 Later cases have
12. Several interesting ideas are set out in the two cases on the technique
to be employed in interpreting the code. The majority in State v. Jones
took the view that criminal statutes were to be strictly construed, while
Justice Hawthorne, in a concurring opinion, contended that under the rule
of construction set out in Art. 3, La. Crim. Code of 1942 (now La. R.S. [1950]
14:3) the words of the provisions are to be given the fair import according
to their meaning. There was also a difference of opinion on how the crim-
inal code should be construed in State v. Sims. The majority of the court
held that the rule of Art. 18, La. Crim. Code of 1942, to the effect that con-
duct was justifiable if authorized by law, was applicable here. Justice
Hawthorne argued, this time in a dissenting opinion, that such reasoning
would lead to the conclusion that no activity would be criminal unless also
a violation of a civil obligation.
13. "But by the phrase 'admit proof of paternity' the Legislature might
well have intended only the introduction of evidence in the case . . . an
illegitimate child to establish that the child's mother was unmarried and
that the accused was responsible for its birth." State v. Randall, 219 La.
578, 53 So. 2d 689, 691 (1951).
14. Jobert v. Pitot, 4 La. Ann. 305 (1849); Succession of Hebert, 33 La.
Ann. 1099 (1881).




established the principle that either parent may acknowledge
informally. 16 Whether or not such an informal acknowledgment
will suffice under the court's test as a basis for a criminal action
and, if so, whether or not such an acknowledgment may be proved
in the same suit in which the criminal liability is sought to be
fixed, are open questions. In any event, there are certain kinds
of illegitimates who, cannot be acknowledged under the code; 1'7
thus it may readily be seen that if acknowledgment were the
only condition upon which a criminal action could be predicated
there would be instances in which prosecution under the statute
would be impossible. The court, however, has provided us with
a second condition, the existence of which will allow the crim-
inal action: that instance in which the paternity of the child
has been established in an earlier suit.
PRIOR JUDICIAL DETERMINATION
It is noteworthy that the alternative prerequisites in the
court's test seem to track Article 242 of the Civil Code, which
sets out conditions precedent in an illegitimate's suit for alimony.
If this were consciously chosen as a guiding principle, will the
prior determination of paternity be limited, as in the article, to
cases brought by the children to prove their paternal or maternal
descent? It is obvious that paternity or maternity could be judi-
cially established in actions of other types.18 In view of the seem-
ing tendency of the court to restrict the application of the statute,
it might well be subjected to this further limitation.
As our court has indicated,' 9 there is substantial authority
in other states favoring the requirement of a civil duty of sup-
port before entry into a criminal court 2 0 and equally strong
16. Hart v. Hoss and Elder, 26 La. Ann. 90 (1874); Bourriaque v. Charles,
107 La. 217, 31 So. 757 (1902); Taylor v. Allen, 151 La. 82, 91 So. 635 (1922);
Murdock v. Potter, 155 La. 145, 99 So. 18 (1924); Succession of Corsey, 171 La.
663, 131 So. 841 (1931); Succession of Tyson, 186 La. 516, 172 So. 772 (1937);
State v. DeLavallade, 215 La. 123, 39 So. 2d 845 (1949); Damman v. Viada,
216 La. 1087, 45 So. 2d 632 (1950), Comment, 6 Tulane L. Rev. 120 (1931),
Oppenheim, Acknowledgment and Legitimation in Louisiana-Louisiana Act
50 of 1944, 19 Tulane L. Rev. 325 (1945).
17. See Art. 204, La. Civil Code of 1870.
18. Such a determination could be made, for example, in a succession
proceeding. The code itself provides another illustration in Article 211, under
which a rape victim may have it judicially established that her attacker is
the father of her child under certain circumstances.
19. State v. Sims, 57 So. 2d 177 (La. 1952).
20. Coan v. State, 224 Ala. 584, 141 So. 263 (1932); Morgan v. State, 28
Ala. App. 241, 182 So. 466 (1938), cert. denied 236 Ala. 381, 182 So. 468 (1938);
State v. Byron, 79 N.H. 39, 104 AtI. 401 (1918); Porter v. Wainwright, 104
N.J.L. 51, 139 AtI. 394 (1927). The rule in West Virginia, shown in State v.
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arguments have been made for the other view. 21 There are also
variations on the two approaches. The rule in West Virginia is,
for example, that in the absence of an admission of paternity by
the accused or a previous adjudication declaring him to be the
father of the child, a criminal action may be brought against him
for nonsupport of his illegitimate child and the paternity of the
child proved in that suit if the child is not yet three years of
age.2 2 Another state supreme court requires as a prerequisite to
the criminal action either a judgment under the bastardy act of
the state or an acknowledgment of the child by the accused. It
has been held, however, that this acknowledgment needs no par-
ticular form but suffices so long as the accused "should make his
purpose known to the public." 23
Other questions will arise under the new statute. The court
will probably be asked, in the not too distant future, whether
or not the provision on illegitimates will require the support of
a child born before the enactment of the section (the failure to
support having occurred after the act). A tendency is seen in
the jurisprudence of other states to apply statutes providing for
the support of illegitimates to all children in that category,
regardless of whether they were born before the passage of the
statute or after it, so long as the act of omission (failure to sup-
port) took place while the statute was in effect. This has been
Bennett, 90 W. Va. 477, 111 S.E. 1.A6 (1922):. State v. Peed. 107 W. Va. 563. 149
S.E. 669 (1929): State v. Hoult, 113 W. Va. 587. 169 S.E. 241 (19%3): Holmes v.
Clegg. 131 W. Va. 449, 48 S.E. 2d 438 (19AS), is only partial support for the
court's view as will be explained later. While the Missnuri rule would seem
to favor the court in the csqes of Stnte ex rel. Canfield v. Portefeld. 222
Mo. ADD. 553. 292 S.W. 85 (1927) and State v. Ba-cikowskv. 1A3 S.W. 2d RA1
(Mo. ADD. 1940), these were seriously shaken by State v. Williams, 224 S.W.
2d 844 (Mo. App. 1949).
21. People v. Stanlev, 33 Calif. Ann. 624. 166 Pac. 596 (1917): Peorle v.
Hamil. 73 Calif. Ann. 649. 2.18 Pac. 1075 (1925): Wamsley v. People. 64 Colo.
521, 173 Pac. 425 (1918); State v. Richardson. 31 Del. 14, 110 AtI. 660 (1920);
Commonweplth v. Gross. 324 Maqs. 123, 85 N.E. 2d 249 (1949); State v. Spill-
man, 210 N.C. 271. 186 S.E. 322 (1936).
22. State v. Bennett. 90 W. Va. 477. 111 SE. 146 (1922): State v. Reed,
107 W. Va. 563, 149 S.E. 669 (1929): State v. Hoult. 113 W. Va. 587, 169 S.E.
241 (1933); Holmes v. Clegg, 131 W. Va. 449, 48 S.E. 2d 438 (1948). The case
of Holmes v. Clegg sets out the test this way: A prosecution for nonsupport
of an illegitimate child cannot be maintained unless: (1) the child Is under
the age of three years; or (2) the paternity is admitted by the defendant;
or (3) the defendant admitted the paternity of the child before it reached
the age of three years; or (4) the paternity has been judicially determined
in a bastardy prosecution commenced within three years after the birth of
the child.
23. Law v. State, 238 Ala. 428, 191 So. 801 (1939).
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held where the statute was criminal,2 4 civil,25 and criminal in
form but civil in substance and effect.26 This may well be the
application given to the amended Article 74.
Whether or not the court will require demand on the part
of an interested party for the support of the child before allow-
ing a criminal action is also an open question. The court had
held, before the statute was amended to cover illegitimates, that
no demand was necessary by the mother for the support of a
minor child in order that a criminal action be commenced against
the father.27 The rationale in those cases was to the effect that
the father was aware of his duty toward the child and of his
failure to fulfill it. It is likely that this reasoning may be held
inapplicable in a suit involving an illegitimate, wherein the
accused might, with some degree of credulity, deny knowledge
of the child's existence.
The position taken by the court-requiring acknowledg-
ment or a previous adjudication in order to sue for the support
of an illegitimate-has serious social consequences. The purpose
of the statute was obviously to alleviate, to some degree at any
rate, the burden upon the state and its various agencies of caring
for those illegitimate children who are fathered by individuals
uninhibited by conscience or sense of duty. That the decisions
discussed above will thwart this aim considerably cannot be
denied.28 Contrary rulings in those cases would, however, have
raised another practical problem, equally difficult of solution. A
criminal action in which a person could be accused of failing to
support an illegitimate, found to be its father, and convicted,
would be an extremely useful blackmail tool in the hands of an
unscrupulous woman.
2 9
24. Wamsley v. People, 64 Colo. 521, 173 Pac. 425 (1918); Bradfleld v.
State, 28 Del. 262, 92 Atl. 988 (1914); Richardson v. State, 30 Del. 534, 109 Ati.
124 (1920); Commonwealth v. Callaghan, 223 Mass. 150, 111 N.E. 773 (1916).
25. State ex rel. Woolems v. Davis, 178 Ark. 692, 111 S.W. 2d 479 (1928);
McLain v. Meadows, 44 Calif. App. 402,186 Pac. 411 (1919).
26. Cummings v. Church, 50 R.I. 71, 145 Atl. 102 (1929).
27. State v. Clark, 144 La. 328, 80 So. 578 (1919); State v. Clark, 146 La.
421, 83 So. 696 (1920).
28. This was pointed out by Justice Hawthorne in his dissent in State v.
Sims, 57 So. 2d 177 (La. 1952).
29. In the case of State v. Williams, 224 S.W. 2d 844, 849 (Mo. App. 1949),
the court answered this argument, saying, "If it be said that the 1947 statute,
supra, opens the way for designing persons to bring the pressure of public
prosecution to compel the alleged father to support an illegitimate child
where the question of his parentage of the child is clouded with doubt, the
only answer is that the enactment of such a statute was and is a matter
within the province of the Legislature .... It goes without saying, however,
that in view of the forward step taken by the Legislature in making an
1952]
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It may well be that the legislature, in passing the statute in
question, was willing to permit this latter problem, considering
it the lesser of two evils. If so, in light of the court's clear and
firm stand on the matter, our lawmaking body will have to legis-
late still further in order to accomplish the desired result. In
this case it would be necessary to amend Article 74 of the Crim-
inal Code so that it will clearly encompass those situations in
which the court has thus far held the statute inapplicable. The
following is a suggested remedy.
Subsection (2) of Article 74 would have to be amended so
that the provision would read in part as follows:
"Criminal neglect of family is the desertion or inten-
tional nonsupport: . . . (2) By either parent of his minor
child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, who is in destitute
or necessitous circumstances, there being a duty under this
act upon the parent of any illegitimate minor child for the
support and maintenance of such illegitimate child; the
question of paternity or maternity to be determined in pro-
ceedings hereunder." 3o
It might be well to insert an express provision to the effect that
the presumption of paternity established under the Civil Code be
retained in order to insure that the new legislation will not
overthrow the Randall case, the result of which seems legally
and socially correct.
CONCLUSION
In light of the evident attitude of our highest tribunal on
the subject of criminal liability for the nonsupport of illegiti-
mates it is not illogical to assume that that body will, when
illegitimate child an object of State protection, trial courts and appellate
courts should exercise care in sustaining convictions under present day
statutes and should require substantial proof of all the necessary elements
before permitting any such conviction to stand."
30. The italicized portions of the above suggested statute have been
added; at present, the statute reads as follows, the parts omitted above
being shown in brackets: "Criminal neglect of family is the desertion or
Intentional non-support: . . . (2) By either parent of his minor child, whether
legitimate or Illegitimate, who is in destitute or necessitous circumstances.
[Solely for the purpose of determining the obligation to support, the court
shall admit proof of paternity or maternity or both.]
The two clauses added were taken partly from two existing statutes:
Del. Rev. Code 1935, § 3527, provides: "It is made the duty of the parent of
any illegitimate child or children, under the age of sixteen years, to provide
for the support and maintenance of such illegitimate child or children." In
Mass. Stat. Ann. 1933, c. 273, § 15, there is a provision to the effect that
"the question of paternity shall be determined in proceedings herewith."
[VOL. XII
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dealing with legislation on this subject, continue to restrict its
application by means of strict construction and a reading in of
older provisions. As the statute which has been so restricted
seems to be drafted with a view toward broader application than
it is presently being given, it is not unlikely that it will undergo
a revision in the near future, such change providing a tool which
should prove useful in the solution of a vexing social and eco-
nomic problem in our state.
Jerry Simon
Creditors' Remedies Against Holders
of Watered Stock
Watered stock has been traditionally defined as "stock which
is issued by a corporation as fully paid-up stock, when in fact
the whole amount of the par value thereof has not been paid
in." 1 The term includes "bonus shares," "discount shares," shares
issued for over-valued services or property, and other forms of
shares issued for a fictitious consideration. It should be kept in
mind that in the watered stock situation there is no outstanding
promise to pay as in the case of an unpaid subscription.2 Hence,
any action against the stockholder must be ex delicto or based
on statutory liability.
Since the passage of the corporation act in 19283 there have
been no reported Louisiana cases on the liability of holders of
watered stock to creditors. Necessarily, our subject will be
limited to a discussion of the different theories of liability in
other jurisdictions, the basis for liability in Louisiana before1928, and the writer's views on which theory should be used by
our courts today.
I. THEORIES OF LiABILITY IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
A. The Trust Fund Theory
The leading case of Scovill v. Thayer4 involved an agree-
ment between a shareholder and a corporation whereby the
latter issued fully paid stock at a discount with a provision that
1. Black, Law Dictionary (3 ed. 1933).
2. Gray Construction Co. v. Fantle, 62 S.D. 345, 253 N.W. 464 (1934); 13
Am. Jur., Corporations § 563 (1934). See La. R.S. (1950) 12:15.
3. La. Act 250 of 1928, now La. R.S. (1950) 12:1-71.
4. 105 U.S. 143 (1881).
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